Introduction
============

Antibiotic resistance of bacterial pathogens is an emerging problem worldwide. While no longer limited to hospitals, inpatient care is still a focal point for problems associated with bacterial resistance. Besides MRSA, prevalence of other emerging nosocomial pathogens like multiresistant *Enterobacteriacae* and *C. difficile* have remarkably increased recently \[[@R1]\].

As multidrug resistant organisms (MDRO) fail to respond to antimicrobial therapy, infections due to these pathogens are prolonged, more severe and cause more complications. They also lead to higher tangible as well as intangible costs \[[@R2]\], \[[@R3]\], \[[@R4]\], \[[@R5]\], \[[@R6]\], \[[@R7]\], \[[@R8]\], \[[@R9]\], \[[@R10]\]. Outbreaks with these organisms do not only affect and harm numerous patients but can also lead to closure or severe impairment of the function of medical facilities, causing enormous costs \[[@R11]\].

To combat MRDOs networks of care providers have been established in all states in Germany. These networks are coordinated by the local, regional or state health authorities supported by the Robert Koch-Institute \[[@R12]\]. For a start, the unified management of MRSA was the main objective in most of these networks. To increase awareness of as well as knowledge on the regional epidemiology of MRDOs, some networks have conducted prevalence surveys, and some of these have been published \[[@R12]\].

In addition, the HICARE-network, established 2010 as part of a project, founded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research of Germany to combat MRDOs, has published data from a voluntary, German-wide, multicenter point-prevalence survey in 2011 conducted in collaboration with the German Society of Hospital Hygiene. Besides MRSA, the prevalence of other MRDOs was assessed. The study, including 3,411 patients of five tertiary and four secondary care hospitals across Germany, showed a prevalence of 1.8% of MRSA, 0.45% of ESBL-*E. coli*, 0.41% of ESBL-*Klebsiella*spp., 0.53% of multiresistant *Pseudomonas*spp., 0.15% of multiresistant *Acinetobacter*spp., 0.49% of VRE and 1.01% of CDAD, with great local differences \[[@R13]\].

To reevaluate the epidemiology and support awareness of MRDO in Germany, a succession survey was initiated by the HICARE-network \[[@R14]\] and conducted in May 2012.

Method
======

The survey was conducted as a voluntary, anonymous, point-prevalence in May 2012 using routine data of microbiological diagnostics that have to be present in hospitals in Germany by law \[[@R15]\]. To allow comparison to the former survey as well as to the former distinction between primary, secondary and tertiary care hospitals, only data from intensive care units, surgical and medical wards were collected.

Based on the survey form used in 2010 \[[@R13]\], an updated version including more pathogens and corrected issues observed in the former survey was generated and converted into an active PDF-form (Adobe Acrobat X). The form was sent by E-mail to 1550 hospitals by the last week of April in 2012. Returned surveys were collected and consolidated using build-in functions of Adobe Acrobat and Microsoft Excel.

The following emerging bacterial pathogens were included in the survey: Methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA) (total as well as separated in hospital-acquired (HA), community-acquired (CA) and, lifestock-associated (LA) MRSA), vancomycin resistant *S. aureus* (VRSA/GRSA), vancomycin resistant (VR) *Enteroococcus* (E.) *faecalis/E. faecium*, extended-spectrum-beta-lactamase-building (ESBL) *E. coli* (ESBL-EC) and *Klebsiella pneumoniae* (ESBL-KP), multiresistant *Acinetobacter* spp. (MAB), multiresistant *Pseudomonas spp.* (MRP), carbapenemase-producing *Enterobacteriaceae* (CRE) as well as *Clostridium difficile* (CDAD) infections *including* severe infections requiring ICU-treatment.

To exclude outbreaks as possible confounder, hospitals were asked whether an outbreak with these pathogens was ongoing at the day of the survey.

Additionally, structure data on the level of care, number of beds, staffing with infection control personnel and the presence of admission screening for the pathogens were assessed. Finally, we assessed by whom and by which method the epidemiological data were provided.

Results
=======

Response rate and data on the structure of hospitals and infection control
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

From the 1,550 hospitals asked to participate, 62 returned data (4%). Data from 56 hospitals (3.6%) were analyzable and included in the study. Out of the 56 hospitals ten (18%) were tertiary care providers, 20 (36%) were secondary and 26 (46%) primary care hospitals (Table 1 [(Tab. 1)](#T1){ref-type="fig"}).

Data collection
---------------

In most hospitals, data were collected at the wards. Some, especially tertiary care hospitals used data stored in electronic systems (Table 2 [(Tab. 2)](#T2){ref-type="fig"}).

In most hospitals, data were collected by infection control personnel, mostly infection control nurses (Table 3 [(Tab. 3)](#T3){ref-type="fig"}).

Prevalence data
---------------

MRSA was the most frequently reported organism with 1.53% \[CI95: 1.32--1.75\], followed by CDAD 1.30% \[CI95: 1.11--1.50\], ESBL-EC 0.97% \[CI95: 0.80--1.14\], ESBL-KP 0.27% \[CI95: 0.18--0.36\] and VR-*E. faecium* 0.27% \[CI95: 0.18--0.36\], regardless of the level of care or ward. MRP were less frequent (depending on level of care 0.14--0.17% and depending on ward 0.03--0.72%). MAB was rarely reported (overall 0.02--0.1%).

CA-MRSA, LA-MRSA, VRSA, VR-*E. faecalis* and Carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae were not reported. Only a small percentage of CDAD infections required ICU-treatment (overall 0.02--0.6%).

As expected, the prevalence of MRDOs depended on the level of care (Table 4 [(Tab. 4)](#T4){ref-type="fig"}) and on the type of ward (Table 5 [(Tab. 5)](#T5){ref-type="fig"}). While confidence intervals of prevalence overlapped for MRSA and ESBL-EC and ESBL-KP between levels of care, VR-*E. feacalis* was rarely reported in secondary and primary care hospitals compared to tertiary care hospitals (Table 4 [(Tab. 4)](#T4){ref-type="fig"}).

Overall prevalence was highest on intensive care wards (Table 5 [(Tab. 5)](#T5){ref-type="fig"}) without overlapping confidence intervals for MRSA and ESBL-EC. The prevalences were remarkably high on medical wards compared to surgical wards (Table 5 [(Tab. 5)](#T5){ref-type="fig"}).

Staffing with infection control personnel
-----------------------------------------

As expected, the survey revealed differences between different levels of care. While all tertiary care providers employed their own infection control nurse, secondary and primary care hospitals employed infection control nurse only in about 70%. Surprisingly not in all tertiary hospitals an internal infection control doctor existed. In two tertiary care providers neither an internal nor an external infection control doctor was available (Table 6 [(Tab. 6)](#T6){ref-type="fig"}).

Screening regime
----------------

Most hospitals reported to have a MRSA-admission screening established, but using different methods. The definitions of the KRINKO guideline \[[@R16]\] are most often used to identify patients eligible for screening. This includes the screening of patients with two defined risk factors. 11 of the 56 hospitals screen patients with only one risk factor and 11 hospitals used their own definition (Table 7 [(Tab. 7)](#T7){ref-type="fig"}). In one tertiary medical centre beyond to the screening of patients with one risk factor each newly admitted patient is screened on medical and surgical ICUs, stroke unit, weaning unit, dermatology, neonatology as well as all surgical patients with planned perioperative antibiotic prophylaxis. Also, in this centre a screening for VRE and 4 MRGN is established. Two other hospitals screen each admitted in-patient. It was noticeable that the screening in all hospitals was performed with internal infection control staff. Up to now no screening is established for other MDROs.

Discussion
==========

This survey is an update to a survey conducted two years earlier using the same approach to collect data. However, a direct comparison between both surveys is not possible, because the samples are not identical and both surveys were anonymous, thus it is unclear if the same hospitals had participated. Finally the questionnaire used has been improved, controlling for possible confounders and assessing more information on the structure and organization of infection control measures in the participating hospitals.

With almost 13,000 patients in 56 hospitals distributed all over Germany, the second survey includes more than three times more patients as the first survey and therefore not only adds valuable information on the epidemiology of emerging nosocomial pathogens, but also helps to raise awareness of the problem of antibacterial resistance in Germany. The prevalences reported here are lower compared to our former survey \[[@R13]\] but tend to be higher than those reported in 2009 \[[@R17]\]. The explanation for the slightly lower prevalence compared to our first survey is the dominance of secondary and primary levels of care in the new prevalence study and furthermore the larger sample size.

Most remarkably, despite the frequency of MRDOs and the problems typically associated with these pathogens, staffing with infection control personnel seems to be inadequate in some hospitals, especially in some secondary and primary care hospitals. Some hospitals reported to have no infection control personnel available at all. These results are in line with another survey reported in this issue \[[@R18]\].

Conclusion
==========

Point-prevalence studies, using existing routine data, can help to raise and maintain awareness as well as knowledge of the epidemiology of MRDOs and can therefore contribute to successful prevention strategies. While prevalences of individual MRDOs vary, antimicrobial resistance is an issue in all hospitals and wards regardless of the level of care or type of ward. Awareness, knowledge and responsibility are needed in order to not only control but primarily to prevent transmission as well as infection \[[@R19]\].
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